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BY THE ENTIRETY.-Estate taxes, or death taxes, as they are
generally called, are of great antiquity. This mode of taxation
was instituted by the Romans in the days of Augustus and was
used by the nations of Europe throughout the Middle Ages, as it
is now being used by the governments of the twentieth century.'
These taxes are usually imposed, either on the privilege of a decedent to transfer property or on the privilege of an heir or legatee
to receive property; the former being the nature of the federal estate tax now in effect.2 Congress in the Constitution is given the
power to levy taxes 3 and it has long since been settled that our
federal government through its legislative branch has the power to
tax transmission of legacies. 4 Such a tax is an excise or duty 5
and not a direct tax which requires apportionment under the Constitution, nor is it a tax upon property. It is simply a tax upon the
transfer or transmission of property by will or descent," and as such
is not an unconstitutional interference
with the rights of the states
7
to regulate descent and distribution.
The federal estate tax law in effect now, in so far as it pertains to the interest of a deceased in property held jointly or by
the entirety, is embodied in Section 302 (e) of the Revenue Act of
1926.8 At common law such estates were not subject to a transfer
COOLEY, TAXATION

(4th ed.)

136.

736; Young Men's Christian Association v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 44 Sup. Ct. 291 (1924) ; Edwards v.
Slocum,
264 U. S. 61, 44 Sup. Ct. 293 (1924).
3
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Act 1, Section 8, Clause 1.
'Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747 (1900).
SShwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 391 (1922).
'Supra note 4; United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct. 1073
(1896).
'New York Trust Company v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 41 Sup. Ct. 506
(1921).
844 Stat. 70, 26 U. S. Code 1094 (e). "The value of the gross estate of
the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death
of all property * * * (e) To the extent of the interest therein held as joint
tenants by the decedent and any other person, or as tenants by the entirety by
the decedent and spouse, * * * except such part thereof as may be shown to
have originally belonged to such other person and never to have been received
or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than a fair consideration
2 MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL

TAX HANDBOOK (1932)

in money or money's worth * * *." This estate tax is based on the Revenue
Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 777, which has frequently been amended. REVENUE ACT
OF 1918, 40 Stat. 1097; REVENUE ACT OF 1921, 42 Stat. 227; REVENUE ACT OF
1924, 43 Stat. 303; REVENUE ACT OF 1926, 44 Stat. 69.
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tax upon the death of one of the tenants inasmuch as the undivided
interest of decedent was deemed to have passed to the survivor, not
by event of death, but by the instrument creating the estate.9 However, under the statute 10 they are subject to the federal estate tax
regardless of when the tenancy was created." The Supreme Court
held in Tyler v. United States12 that an earlier provision1 3 corresponding to Section 302(e) was not invalid as imposing a direct
tax without apportionment, or being "arbitrary and capricious," '4
for at the deceased's death, and because of it, the survivor "for the
first time became entitled to exclusive possession, use and enjoyment" of the estate; "she ceased to hold the property subject to
qualifications imposed by law relating to tenancies by the entirety,
and became entitled to hold and enjoy it absolutely as her own." 15
Then, and then only, did she acquire the power not theretofore possessed of disposing of the property by an exercise of her sole will.
In Phillip v. The Dime Trust and Safe Deposit Company 16 the
applicability of the corresponding section of the Revenue Act of
1924 to property held in tenancies by the entirety created before
1924, but after 1916,17 was before the court. That case held this
section not to be capricious and arbitrary in respect to such property. The statute involved herein is expressly made applicable to
estates created and existing before the passage of the act; 18 the
same provision with little variation appearing in the 1916 and successive acts.' 9 This type of property interest has therefore been
embraced within an established taxing system prior to the creationof the estates in question, and the fact that it was so embraced, of
necessity, relieves the statute of the objection that it is arbitrarily
retroactive. To hold otherwise would make the statute amenable
to evasion, and would be entirely opposed to the expressed intention of Congress. These opinions, however, failed to expressly pass
on the constitutionality of a tax on joint estates or estates by the
'Infra note 36.
"Supra note 8.
"Infra notes 12, 14, 16, 23 and 24.
's281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (1930) ; (1930) 5 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 135.
REVENUE AcT OF 1916, §202 (c), 39 Stat. 777, 778.
s, This case involved a tenancy by the entirety created subsequent to the
enactment of the taxing act before the court.
" Supra note 12, at 504.
"8284 U. S. 160, 52 Sup. Ct. 46 (1931).
"' This is the year in which the first law containing a similar section was
enacted.
" §302, subd. (h) of Revenue Act of 1924 reads: "Subdivisions (b), (c),
(d), (e), (f), (g) of this section shall apply to the transfers, trusts, estates,
interests, rights, powers, and relinquishment of powers, as severally enumerated
and described therein, whether made, created, arising, existing, exercised, or
relinquished before or after the enactment of this act."
11§202, REVENUE AcT OF 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 777-778; §300, REVENUE Acr OF

1917, 39 Stat. 1000, 1002; §402, REVENUE AcT
§402, REVENUE AcT OF 1921, 42 Stat. 227, 278.

OF

1918, 40 Stat. 1057, 1097;
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entirety, created prior to 1916,20 for such estates were not involved
therein. The language of the court in the Tyler case, 21 that "The
death of one of the parties to the tenancy became the generating
source of important and definite accession to the property rights
of the other," leads one to believe that by implication, the constitutionality of such a tax could have been upheld. But it was not
until the Supreme Court had before it a set of facts and circumstances which required of it a definite expression as to the effect
of a tax on such an estate, that we find the rule directly stated, the
court holding taxable a transfer of property which was owned under
a joint tenancy created by a transfer in 1915. In June, 1915, J. H.
Gwin, the petitioner in the case, and his mother, residents of California, acquired by equal contribution certain property as joint
tenants which they continued to hold until her death on October 5,
1924. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue included the value
of one-half of the property which decedent and her son had acquired as stated in arriving at the federal estate tax. This was
challenged as error. The Supreme Court affirmed the commissioner's ruling and pointed out that by this transfer the rights of
possible survivorship were not irrevocably fixed, since under the
state law the joint estate might have been terminated through voluntary conveyance by either party, through proceedings for partition,
or through an involuntary alienation under an execution. The right
to effect these changes in the estate were not terminated until the
co-tenant's death. Cessation of this power "after enactment of the
Revenue Act of 192422 presented proper occasion for imposition
of the tax. The death became the generating source of definite accession to the survivor's property rights.23

This rule has recently

been extended to apply to the interests of decedents in estates by
the entirety created prior to 1916.24

In its most recent expression on this subject,25 the Supreme
Court was deciding the effect of the estate tax on real property situated in Illinois which was conveyed in 1909 to decedent and his
wife "not in tenancy in common, but in joint tenancy," it not appearing whether the wife made any contribution to the cost of
the real estate. The husband died in 1923. Section 402 of the
Revenue Act of 1921 26 in effect at the date of the husband's death,
provided: "That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall
' Supra note 17.
Supra note 12.
' This act in respect to taxing joint estates is similar to the one now in
effect. Supra note S.
' Gwin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 287 U. S. 224, 53 Sup. Ct.
157 (1932).
' Third National Bank and Trust Company v. White, 287 U. S.577, 53
Sup. Ct. 290 (1932).
. Griswald et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 290 U. S. -, 54
Sup. Ct. 5 (1933).
242 Stat. 278.
2
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be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all
property * * * (d) To the extent of the interest therein held jointly
or as tenants by the entirety by the decedent and any other person
* * except such part thereof as may be shown to have belonged to
such other person and never to have been received or acquired by the
latter from the decedent for less than a fair consideration in money
or money's worth. * * *"

No express provision was made in the

section as to whether the statute referred to transfers made and
estates created before or after the passage of the act. In their return for the federal estate tax, the executors of the deceased husband did not include any of the value of this property thus held
by the husband and wife as joint tenants. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue valued the real estate at $90,000 and included the
whole of it in the value of the decedent's gross estate, as being within the reach of Section 402 (d). Upon appeal the Board of Tax
Appeals held that the value of only the husband's one-half of the
property could be included for the purposes of the tax. 27 Both the
petitioners and the commissioner appealed to the Circuit Court of
Appeals. The latter appeal was dismissed on motion of the commissioner and the only question remaining for determination was
as to the taxation of half of the property. The Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. 28 On a writ of
certiorari, the judgment was affirmed.
Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing the opinion, states:
"Whether this application of the statute gives it a retroactive effect is the sole question here involved; and with it
we find no difficulty. Under the statute the death of the
29
decedent is the event in respect of which the tax is laid.
It is the existence of the joint tenancy at that time, and not
its creation at the earlier date, which furnishes the basis for
the tax. By judgment under review, only half of the value,
that is to say, the value of decedent's interest, has been included, leaving the survivor's interest unaffected. After the
creation of the joint tenancy, and until his death, decedent
retained his interest in, and control over, half of the property.
Cessation of that interest and control presented proper occasion for the imposition of the tax." 30
This decision not only holds to the federal rule as enunciated
in former Supreme Court decisions, 3 ' but in no way changes the
-Griswald et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 23 B. T. A. 635
(1931).
'Griswald et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 62 Fed. 591
(C. C. A. 7th, 1932).

Italics own.

supra note 23 and cases cited.
' Supra notes 23 and 24.
'Ibid.;
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effect of the statute as to the amount taxable upon decedent's death, 32
for this latter point was not at issue.
New York State, prior to September 1, 1930, 33 had experimented greatly with the taxation of joint estates and had made
many changes with the inheritance tax imposed thereon. 34 As a
result, the taxability of any joint estate before 1930 generally depended (1) upon the date of decedent's death and (2) upon the
date of the creation of such estate. If the death occurred after
June 30, 1925 and before September 1, 1930, a joint estate was
subject to the inheritance tax, irrespective of when the estate was
created, as though the decedent was the owner of a fractional part
and had bequeathed such part to the survivor. The entire value
of the property was divided into the number of joint tenants and
the quotient was subject to the tax. 35 Where the death occurred
before July 1, 1925, the following rules prevailed: (1) If the estate was created before May 20, 1915, and the decedent died before such date, no inheritance tax was imposed; 36 (2) if the estate
was created before May 20, 1915, and the decedent died after this
date the transfer was subject to the inheritance tax to the extent
of deceased's interest on that date; 3 (3) if the estate was created
" The property is included in the gross estate to the extent that the
decedent had any interest therein. In joint estates and estates by the entirety,
upon the death of one tenant, that proportion of the value of the property equal
to the proportion he or she contributed to it will be taxable. Where no contribution has been made by any tenant, that is, for example, where the property
was acquired by gift or inheritance, and there is no provision governing the
interest of each tenant in the joint tenancy (there is no need for such provision
in a tenancy by the entirety, for at law each tenant thereof is deemed to have
an equal share), each is deemed to have an equal share and upon death of one
his ratable interest is taxable to his estate.
.The present estate tax law of New York became effective on this date.
TAx LAW, art. 10c, L. 1930, c. 710.
" Prior to 1915, New York followed the common law rule. On May 20,
1915, provision was made (N. Y. Laws [1915] c. 664) for the taxation of
joint estates in intangible personal property as though the whole property
belonged absolutely to the deceased owner and had been transferred to the
survivor by will, the entire property passing to the survivor was taxable. In
1916 the rule was amended (N. Y. Laws [1916] c. 323) to include all property,
both real and personal, tangible and intangible. In 1925 the law was again
changed (N. Y. Laws [1925] c. 143) to subject the estate to taxation as though
the decedent had been the owner of a fractional part of the property and had
bequeathed'his portion to the survivor, only that portion being taxable.
" N. Y. STATE ESTATE TAX LAW, art. 10, 10A, L. 1925, c. 143.
'Re Thompson, 217 N. Y. 609, 111 N. E. 1101 (1915); Matter of Carnegie, 236 N. Y. 517, 142 N. E. 266 (1922) ; cf. Matter of Pitou, 79 Misc.
384, 140 N. Y. Supp. 919 (1913); Matter of Reed, 82 Misc. 632, 154 N. Y.
Supp. 247 (1915).
'Matter of McKelway, 221 N. Y. 15, 116 N. E. 348 (1917). The joint
estate in this case was created before 1915 and the husband died after the
passage of the 1915 amendment taxing joint estates. The court held that a
half interest in the property belonged to the wife in her own right before the
amendment of the transfer tax act, and that a half passed to her thereafter
as survivor of her husband. The tax was restricted to the half, thus accruing
by survivorship after the passage of the act. Cf. Re Wintjen, 99 Misc. 471,
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after May 20, 1915, and decedent died 38before 1925, the entire
estate was subject to the inheritance tax.

In so far as estates by the entirety are concerned, in New
York they are confined to the ownership of real property39 and
they, as the joint estates, before 1930, were dependent upon the
date of decedent's death and upon the date of the creation of such
estates. For inheritance tax purposes before 1930, these estates may
be divided into three groups: (1) where the estate was created before April 26, 1916; 40 (2)* where the estate was created on or
after April 26, 1916, and one of the tenants died before April 17,
1924; (3) where the estate was created on or after April 26, 1916,
and one of the tenants died on or after April 17, 1924. In the first
case, no tax is imposed regardless of the date when the death occurred. In the second case, the whole property is subject to the
tax as though it had belonged absolutely to the decedent and had
been transferred to the survivor by will. In the third instance, onehalf of the property is taxable as though that half belonged4 1 to the
decedent and had been transferred to the survivor by will.

The above interpretations and application by the New York
courts of these amendments to the transfer tax act 42 created a very
complicated set of affairs in the then existent law. To simplify
the situation and to lighten the burden of the lawyer, the legislature on September 1, 1930, enacted a new estate tax law. 43

At

the same time that this new rule went into effect, a new method
of taxing transfers of property became effective. The old law
applied to estates of decedents who died prior to September 1, 1930,
but the new method is used for all transfers that take place due
to death occurring on or after that date. The general purpose of
this new estate tax is to facilitate the harmonizing of the death
165 N. Y. Supp. 927 (1917); In re Horler's Estate, 180 App. Div. 608, 168
N. Y. Supp. 221 (1917); Matter of Ludwig, 113 Misc. 263, 184 N. Y. Supp.
542 (1920); Matter of Reynolds, 120 Misc. 424, 199 N. Y. Supp. 494 (1923).
"Matter of Dolbeer's Estate, 226 N. Y. 623, 123 N. E. 381 (1919) ; Matter
The appellate
of Cossitt's Estate, 236 N. Y. 524, 142 N. E. 268 (1923).
division (204 App. Div. 545, 198 N. Y. Supp. 560 [1923]), in this latter case,
after adverting to the conflicting views of the various surrogates' courts, held
that a joint estate created subsequent to the 1915 amendment was subject to a
transfer tax on its full amount. The Court of Appeals, in affirming, disposed
of the doubt in so far as the law prevailing before the 1925 amendment was
applicable.
Matter of Albrecht, 136 N. Y. 91, 36 N. E. 632 (1891) ; In re Blumenthal's Estate, 236 N. Y. 448, 141 N. E. 911 (1923).
'See In re Lyons Estate, 233 N. Y. 208, 135 N. E. 247 (1933). It was
held, in this decision, that property which was acquired in a tenancy by the
entirety before the enactment of any such transfer tax statute, was exempt
from taxation.
"Art. 105, Reg. §220 (5), art. 10 TAx LAw; §248 (4), art. 10A TAX
LAw, N. Y. Laws (1925) c. 143.
" Supra notes 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40 and 41.
"Art. 10C, TAX LAW, N. Y. Laws (1930) c. 710.
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taxes of the state and federal governments. It therefore follows
44
as closely as it can, the provisions of the federal estate tax law.
45
46
Section 249(r)
provides, as does the federal statute, that
upon the death of a husband or wife who are tenants by the entirety a tax is payable on the value of the property less such part
as can be shown to have originally belonged to the survivor. The
question has arisen, may the tax imposed by this section be applied
to property in which decedent was interested during his lifetime as
a tenant by the entirety when such tenancy was created prior to
the effective date of the statute and prior to the time when property so held was first selected in any of the estate tax laws as an
appropriate subject of taxation? 47 The Court of Appeals in the
Estate of Robert Weiden,48 its most recent expression on the
point, answered in the affirmative. In this case five parcels of real
estate were conveyed to husband and wife as tenants by the entirety
between the years 1893 and 1908. At the time of the husband's
death, Section 249 (r) of the Tax Law was in effect. 49 The appraiser included thereunder, in the gross estate of the husband, the
whole value of the real estate, no showing being made that the wife
had any previous interest in the property or made any contribution
to the cost of acquisition. Upon an appeal from a pro formna order
assessing the tax the Surrogate's Court of Kings County held that
the property should not have been included in the deceased husband's gross estate, and that Section 249(r) of the Tax Law, in
so far as it applied to tenancies by the entirety created prior to 1916,
violated the Constitutions of the United States and of the state of
New York. 50 The Appellate Division affirmed. 5' Upon appeal to
the Court of Appeals that court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed
and remitted the matter to the surrogate for the purpose of including in the transfer tax the estate by the entirety.
The court, in its opinion, states,
5
"In Tyler v. United States, 52 Gwin v. Commissioner,
" and
Third National Bank and Trust Company v. White,5 4 the
"Compare §249 (r) of the New York Estate Tax with §302 (e) of the
Federal Estate Tax Law and note the similarity.
'Supra note 43.
' §302 (e), supra note 8.
' The New York State Legislature first authorized such tax in 1916, c.
323, Laws 1916.
" N. Y. Court of Appeals, November 21, 1933; N. Y. L. J., December 4,
1933, at 2067.
"Supra note 43.
'" Matter of Weiden, 144 Misc. 854, 259 N. Y. Supp. 573 (1932) and 146
Misc. 381, - N. Y. Supp. - (1933).
"1240 App. Div. 716, - N. Y. Supp. - (1933), amending 239 App. Div.
852, - 2 N. Y. Supp. - (1933).
" Supra note 12.
'Supra note 23.
'Supra note 24.

TAX COMMENT
Supreme Court has indicated that the tax does not violate
the provisions of the United States Constitution. We will
apply the same rules in determining the effect of similar provisions of the constitution of this state, for the purpose of
maintaining the uniformity of administration of the Tax
Law 5 which the Legislature has sought to achieve."
In a prior proceeding " decided in October, 1932, before the
decision in the Matter of Weiden " was rendered by the Court of
Appeals, Surrogate Foley held that the whole value of three mortgages acquired by a husband and wife as joint tenants in 1922 and
1928 should not be included in the gross estate of the husband,
who died on December 30, 1930, but that only one-half of the
property was subject to the New York estate tax. This issue arose
again in the Dwyer case upon a subsequent appeal by the State Tax
Commission from the order fixing the estate tax. In this latter
proceeding Surrogate Foley held that the rules which he had deemed
applicable in his prior decision in the Dwyer Estate 5 had been
swept away by the decision in the Matter of Weiden, 59 and that
therefore the entire value of the mortgages should be included in
the gross estate of the husband, it being conceded that the wife had
made no contribution to the joint property.
The surrogate stated:
"The date of the creation of the estate is no longer material. The change of the existing taxing statute, either in
form from a transfer tax to an estate tax, or by any substantial change in the rate of tax, is immaterial. The Court
of Appeals has adopted the rule of the United States Supreme Court, that the death of one of the parties is the 'generating source' 60 of the succession to the entire property and
the whole fund or property must be included in the gross
estate of the decedent." 61
These two cases, the Weiden case 62 and the Dwyer case, 63
in overruling the prior decisions in the Matter of McKelway 64 and
the Matter of Lyon,65 have recognized and effectuated the intent
Consolidated Laws, c. 60.
Estate of Dwyer, 145 Misc. 603, 260 N. Y. Supp. 120 (1932).
Supra note 48.
t'Supra note 56.
"'Sutra note 48.
Tyler v. United States, supra note 12.
' Estate of John Dwyer, N. Y. County Surrogates' Court, November 28,
1933; N. Y. L. J., December 4, 1933, at 2067.
"Supra note 48.
'Supra note 61.
"Supra note 37.
'Supra note 40.
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of the decedent estate commission and the tax commission, which
recommended, and the legislature, which enacted the new Estate
Tax Law, which intent, as we have seen, was to "harmonize so far
as possible the construction and application of the federal and of
the state statutes." Briefly stated, the present New York rule, on
this point, as its federal counterpart, makes death of one of the
parties the "generating source" of the succession to the entire property, and the whole fund or property must be included in the gross
estate of the decedent. The application of this general rule would
be unfair, unreasonable and illogical in the case of a survivor who
had made contribution or who had been, with the decedent, a beneficiary of a gift, bequest or devise which had created the estate.
It is the death of the grantor which brings about "that shifting of
the economic benefits of the property which is the real subject of
the tax." 66 In the case of a tenant who has contributed to the cost
of the estate or who has been the recipient of such bequest, devise
or gift, there is no shifting of the economic benefits from the deceased upon which the tax might be levied, for from the time of
the estate's creation, the survivor was entitled to such economic benefits of his proportionate share. The New York legislature has
wisely and prudently adopted the exception to the general rule, as
embodied in the federal statute, 67 that there shall be excepted such
part of the value of the property "as is proportionate to the consideration furnished" by the survivor; or, "where property has been
acquired by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance, as in a tenancy by
the entirety by the decedent and spouse, then to the extent of onehalf of the value thereof, or where so acquired by the decedent and
any other person as joint tenants * * *, then to the extent of the
value of a fractional part to be determined by dividing the value of
the property by the number of joint tenants." 1s
MuRRAY W.

DUBERSTEIN.

INcOME TAx-ANNUITIES AND INCOMES OF TRusT.-As the
law governing the taxation of incomes has been of comparatively
recent development, it is natural to find that the early decisions of
the courts concerning the taxability of different kinds of incomes
have left many points unsettled, requiring later decisions to determine their status for taxation purposes. Within the last decade,
for example, the courts have been confronted with a series of cases
presenting the question whether, in a given instance, that which
the donee acquired under a will was a bequest or was income. If

"Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126
(1928).
' REVENUE Acr oF 1926, §302 (e) ; sapra note 8.
sN. Y. EsTATE TAx LAW §249-r (5) ; supra note 43.

